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Abstract
The tax wedge is the difference between the employer’s labour costs and the net take-
home pay of the employee. An increase in the tax wedge leads to an increase in the com-
panies’ labour costs and thus indirectly influences the level of unemployment. This article 
will try to answer these questions: Does the tax wedge affect the unemployment rate, how 
high is the tax wedge in Croatia in comparison with OECD countries, how does the tax 
wedge affect the unemployment rate in Croatia and would reducing the tax wedge be a 
solution to reduce unemployment? This article will show that Croatia is a country with a 
high tax wedge, which has negative affects on employment, and is partly “responsible” 
for the high unemployment. Thus, in dealing with unemployment problems, Croatia should 
work on its reduction.
Key words: tax wedge, unemployment rate, labour costs, Croatia, OECD.
1  Introduction 
The tax wedge is the difference between the gross labour costs to the employer and 
the net “take-home” salary of the employee, that is the gross labour costs reduced by the 
mandatory contributions and prescribed taxes paid by the employer and the employee. An 
increase in the tax wedge increases the labour costs of a company, which is a key factor 
in decisions on employment, and so it indirectly affects the unemployment rate. 450
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Our starting point is the assumption that the tax wedge in Croatia is too large and that 
this is precisely one of the main reasons for high unemployment. This article will try to 
answer the following questions: does the tax wedge affect the unemployment rate? How 
large is the tax wedge in Croatia in comparison with OECD countries? How does the tax 
wedge affect the unemployment rate in Croatia, and is a cut in the tax wedge the right so-
lution to reduce unemployment? 
Similar research into the connection between the tax wedge and unemployment has 
already been undertaken (Elmeskov et al, 1998) where, using the regression method, the 
connection was examined between the tax wedge, but also some other factors, and the un-
employment rate in OECD countries. The result of the research showed the significant 
influence of the tax wedge on the unemployment rate. In the period in question, the coun-
tries which reduced unemployment undertook political reforms which, amongst other 
things, also included a reduction in the tax wedge, and they led to a fall in unemployment. 
The authors assessed that in the period in question a reduction in the tax wedge of 7% 
could lead to a reduction in the unemployment rate of about 0.7 percentage points. 
In this article, using descriptive, discriminant and cluster analysis, with figures from 
OECD countries, it will also be shown that the tax wedge affects the unemployment rate, 
and that its reduction would also reduce unemployment, or increase employment. It will 
also be seen that the OECD countries may be categorised into two groups depending on 
their tax wedge and unemployment rate. The first group comprises countries with a low 
tax wedge and a low unemployment rate, whilst the second group comprises those with 
a large tax wedge and a high unemployment rate. This analysis has already been used (Do-
lenc, 2005), where the authors, using these methods, confirmed the interdependence of 
the unemployment rate and the tax wedge. In order to include Croatia in the analysis, these 
analyses were also used in this study. The research will show that Croatia comes into the 
second group, that is, it has a high tax wedge, which has a negative effect on employment 
and that this is partially “responsible” for the high unemployment rate. Therefore, in re-
solving the problem of unemployment in Croatia, work should be done to reduce it. 
After the introduction, we present the methodology used and the source of data, and 
in the third chapter there is an overview of the tax wedge in Croatia. In the fourth chapter 
an analysis is made for OECD countries of their tax wedge and unemployment rates, which 
will confirm or refute the hypothesis of the connection between the tax wedge and the un-
employment rate. After that the tax wedge in Croatia is compared with OECD countries 
and finally there is a conclusion. 
2  Methodology and source of data 
2.1  Methodology
The tax wedge is the difference between labour costs and net take-home pay calcu-
lated in relation to the total labour costs, or as a formula it would look like this: 
PK
BRTRN TP
BRTR
=
  − (1)451
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where TW is the tax wedge, GRLC is the gross labour costs and NTP is net take-home 
pay. 
The tax wedge shows the amount of payments to the state within the total labour cost. 
Payments to the state are prescribed by laws and are therefore different for each country. 
Tax obligations and mandatory contributions vary for difference types of tax payers. They 
depend on the level of the salary of the employee, where they live and the number of de-
pendents which affect the personal allowances of the tax payer. So, in order for us to be 
able to calculate the tax wedge we have to define the “average worker” in Croatia. The 
OECD defines the “average worker” as one employed in sectors C-k. In order to com-
pare the results gained for Croatia with OECD countries, we will use precisely that defi-
nition of the “average worker”. We will look at three different types of employee, depend-
ing on income: 
individuals with 67% (2/3) income of AW  • 
individuals with 100% income of AW  • 
individuals with 167% (5/3) income of AW • 
We will only consider single people, that is individuals without children or depen-
dents. For the sake of comparison with the OECD, we will assume that their salary is their 
only source of revenue, that they have no additional life premiums for life, health or pen-
sion insurance and that they live in Zagreb1.
For an analysis of the interdependence of the tax wedge and the unemployment rate, 
we will use descriptive, cluster and discriminant analysis2. 
The hierarchical cluster analysis used in this study is a way of studying a grouping of 
data, simulated on a diverse scale, creating a cluster tree. The tree does not represent one 
group but a multi-layered hierarchy, so that the groups on the lower level are re-grouped 
into groups on a higher level etc. In order to calculate the distance of the data the Euclid 
norm was used, and to calculate their proximity, that is the similarity of the data, Ward’s 
method was used. As a result of this analysis we obtain a dendrogram, a graph showing 
the hierarchical cluster tree. On the x axis are the numbers of the subjects, whilst on the y 
axis the distances are shown calculated in the previous step. The connection between the 
subjects is shown in the lines in the shape of the letter U. The height of the U shows the 
distance between the subjects. The smaller the distance, the closer the subjects are, that is 
more similar, and the greater the distance between the subjects they are farther apart, that 
is more different. 
Discriminant analysis is an analytical method by which multi-factor data m variables, 
are compared in k previously defined groups, using a linear combination of variables. 
When the data are arranged into two groups the value of the discriminant function is the 
value: <0, for data from the first group; and >0 for data from the second group. 
1 Surtax for the City of Zagreb (18%) is the highest in Croatia (municipalities ≤10%, towns ≤15%), and it would 
be better to use a weighted surtax, but the effect of surtax on the total tax burden is relatively small, 1.4% of the gross 
labour costs, and taking the average surtax would not have a significant effect on the tax wedge, e.g. a change in sur-
tax of 10% would reduce the tax wedge of AW by 64 b.p. 
2 These analyses were used by Dolenc, 2005 for researching the effect of the tax wedge on unemployment in 
Slovenia.452
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2.2  Source of data
The analysis in this study uses two sources of data. 
•   For calculation of the tax wedge in Croatia, the official data were used from the Cro-
atian Central Bureau for Statistics on average salaries and data on the unemploy-
ment rate for further analysis and comparison with OECD countries
•   For comparison of the tax wedge with OECD countries data was used from their 
annual report Taxing Wages 2007/2008 (OECD 2008) and data on unemployment 
taken from OECD.Stat 2009, that is the OECD database.
3  The tax wedge in Croatia
The tax wedge in Croatia is calculated for an “average worker” defined as the tax 
wedge for the three types of employees. The tax wedge is calculated as the difference be-
tween the labour costs and net take home pay calculated in relation to the total costs of la-
bour. In this way the tax wedge in Croatia is obtained for 2007 of 38.4%, for a single per-
son with 67% of the income of the AW, 41.1% for a single person with 100% of the in-
come of the AW and 45.4% for a single person with 167% of the income of the AW. Later 
it will be seen that this is quite a high tax wedge in comparison with other countries.  
Table 1 The ratio of contributions and taxes in the gross labour costs
Single person 
with 67% 
income of AW
Single person 
with 100% 
income of AW
Single person 
with 167% 
income of AW
Gross labour costs  100 100 100
Net salary 61.56 58.88 54.58
Contributions paid by the employee 17.06 17.06 17.06
Contributions paid by the employer 14.68 14.68 14.68
Surtax and income tax 6.70 9.38 13.68
Source: author’s calculation 
Table 1 shows the share of contributions and taxes in the total gross labour costs. The 
greatest expenditure, as can be seen, is on mandatory contributions paid by the employee, 
followed by the mandatory contributions paid by the employer. The smallest sum is the 
share of surtax and income tax. Since surtax and income tax are paid by the employee, we 
see that in Croatia the greatest burden is borne by the employee. The share of mandatory 
contributions paid by the employee and the employer are fixed, that is they do not depend 
on the level of the salary of the employee, and they amount to 17.06% and 14.68%. Sur-
tax and income tax are variable and grow with the increase in the gross salary of the em-
ployee. For our three types of employee they amount to 6.70%, 9.38% and 13.68%. 453
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4  The tax wedge in OECD countries 
4.1  Descriptive analysis 
In Table 2 the tax wedge is shown for OECD countries for 2007, calculated in rela-
tion to the total labour costs. Data is also included on unemployment in those countries 
calculated as the relationship between the unemployed and the total active population. 
There are also data for Croatia, for the sake of comparison, however they are not includ-
ed in the analysis. The data are sorted in ascending order by size of the tax wedge for a 
single person with the wage of an AW. 
Table 2   The tax wedge in relation to gross labour costs and the unemployment rate in 
relation to the active population for OECD countries in 2007
Country Single person 
with 67% 
income of AW
Single person 
with 100% 
income of AW
Single person 
with 167% 
income of AW
Unemployment 
ratea
Mexico 11.10 15.91 21.98 3.4
korea 16.79 19.68 22.50 3.2
New Zealand 19.09 21.54 27.29 3.6
Irelandb 15.73 22.75 33.74 4.6
Australia 23.72 27.72 32.81 4.4
Iceland 23.37 28.12 31.92 2.3
Japan 27.80 29.32 32.39 3.9
USA 27.54 29.68 34.95 4.6
Switzerland 26.97 29.74 34.06 3.6
Canada 26.49 31.20 32.89 6.0
United kingdom  30.62 34.01 37.78 5.4
Luxemburg 29.91 36.30 43.02 4.4
Norway 34.17 37.54 43.14 2.5
Portugal 32.99 37.68 43.45 8.0
Slovakia 35.64 38.57 40.56 11.0
Spain 35.65 38.95 42.40 8.3
Croatia 38.44 41.12 45.42 14.8
Denmark 39.32 41.38 49.74 3.7
Greece 36.74 42.30 47.56 8.1
Turkeyb 41.84 42.74 44.54 9.6
Poland 41.77 42.91 43.82 9.6
Czech Republic 40.60 42.94 46.78 5.3
Finland 38.16 43.59 49.49 6.9
The Netherlands 40.67 44.26 46.06 3.3
Sweden 43.28 45.32 53.04 6.1
Italy 42.58 46.24 51.18 6.2
Austria 44.13 48.58 50.73 5.1
France 45.44 49.23 53.11 8.0
Germany 47.75 52.60 53.26 8.3
Hungary 46.02 54.53 58.62 7.4
Belgium 50.01 55.77 61.01 7.4
Average without Croatia 33.86 37.70 42.13 5.8
a  The ratio of unemployment in the total active population.
b  Using the old definition of AW, that is a work employed in sector D.
Source: for tax wedge - OECD (2008); for unemployment - OECD (2009); for Croatia - DZS454
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From the Table it may be seen that the tax wedge in OECD countries is very varied, 
which is to be expected due to the large differences between them. The smallest tax wedge 
is in Mexico (from 11.1 to 22.0) and the largest in Belgium (from 50.0 to 61.0), whilst the 
average of all OECD countries is from 33.9 to 42.1, that is the range of the tax wedge is 
quite large. From the table it may also be seen that all the OECD countries and Croatia as 
well, have a progressive tax wedge, that is, with the increase in income, the tax wedge 
also increases. In this way employees with lower incomes are protected and the greater 
tax burden is transferred to the “wealthier” employees, that is, employees with larger in-
comes. The unemployment rate in OECD countries is also quite varied, from 2.4% in 
Mexico to 11.0 % in Poland, and the average is 5.8%. In further analyses we will consid-
er a single person with 100% of the income of an AW as the representative sample. 
By dividing the range of tax wedge in OECD countries into three equal parts, we ob-
tain the following three classes: countries with a low tax wedge – Mexico, korea, New 
Zealand, Ireland, Australia and Iceland; countries with a medium sized tax wedge – Japan, 
the USA, Switzerland, Canada, the United kingdom, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Spain, Denmark, and Greece; and countries with a high tax wedge – Turkey, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, Austria, France, Ger-
many, Hungary and Belgium. 
Figure 1 Histogram of the three classes of OECD countries
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Source: Table 2
In order to see whether the low tax wedge corresponds to a low unemployment rate 
and a high tax wedge to a high unemployment rate, the medians of the three classes are 
calculated.
The median tax wedge by class is 22.1; 36.9 and 45.8 and the median unemployment 
rate is 3.5; 5.0 and 7.2. We can see that in the group with a lower tax wedge the unem-
ployment rate is also lower, whilst in the group with the higher tax wedge the unemploy-455
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ment rate is also higher, so it may be concluded that the tax wedge affects the unemploy-
ment rate. 
Whether the tax wedge affects unemployment, how and by how much, may also be 
tested by calculating the coefficient of the correlation of the tax wedge and the unemploy-
ment rate. The correlation coefficient for OECD countries is +0.568, which means that 
the variables are positively correlated. The p-value is 0.0011 (<0.05), that is with great 
probability (0.99) the hypothesis can be rejected that these two variables are not correlat-
ed, and it may be said that the correlation is significant. 
Figure 2 The medians of the three classes
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Source: Table 2
Therefore, descriptive analysis confirms the hypothesis that the tax wedge and the 
unemployment rate are connected. 
4.2  Cluster analysis 
The hierarchical cluster analysis could show which countries are similar in terms of 
the tax wedge and the unemployment rate, and thereby also show whether those two vari-
ables are interrelated. Cluster analysis for OECD countries resulted in the following den-
drogram: 456
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Figure 3 Dendrogram of cluster analysis of OECD countries
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Source: author’s calculation; using MATLAB functions
The values on the x axis are the ordinal numbers of the OECD countries as follows: 
1–Mexico, 2–korea, 3–New Zealand, 4–Ireland, 5–Australia, 6–Iceland, 7–Japan, 8–USA, 
9–Switzerland, 10–Canada, 11–United kingdom, 12–Luxembourg, 13–Norway, 14–Por-
tugal, 15–Slovakia, 16–Spain, 17–Denmark, 18–Greece, 19–Turkey, 20–Poland, 21–Czech 
Republic, 22–Finland, 23–The Netherlands, 24–Sweden, 25–Italy, 26–Austria, 27–France, 
28–Germany, 29–Hungary, 30–Belgium. Whilst the y axis shows the Euclid distance from 
the centre of the cluster. 
We can see that the most similar in pairs are Turkey and Poland, Japan, the USA and 
Switzerland, Sweden and Italy etc. However, what is even more interesting is the fact that 
the countries are divided into two groups. The first group is countries numbered 1 to 13, 
and the second countries from 14 to 30. In the following table a more detailed description 
is given of those two groups.
Table 3   The characteristics of two groups of OECD countries obtained by cluster 
analysis 
Group Tax wedge Unemployed rate
1 (n=13) 26.7 ± 10.8 4.2 ± 1.9
2 (n=17) 46.7 ± 19.0 7.2 ± 3.8
Total 35.8 ± 19.9 6.7 ± 4.4
From Table 3 it is visible that the first group has a smaller tax wedge and a lower un-
employment rate than the second group. This result again confirms the hypothesis of the 
interdependence of the tax wedge and the unemployment rate.457
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4.3  Discriminant analysis 
Using the classification gained by cluster analysis, discriminant analysis was per-
formed for OECD countries. The function of discriminant analysis obtained 3 is:
z =         +     +   −7.314 0.144 0.323 pk sn, (5)
Where z are the discriminant function values, tw the tax wedge and ur the unemploy-
ment rate.
The discriminant function value of countries in the group with a small tax wedge and 
low unemployment rate is negative, whilst for countries in the group with a large tax wedge 
and high unemployment rate it has positive value. The discriminant function divides coun-
tries into the same groups as the cluster analysis, except Denmark. That is to say, the dis-
criminant function value for Denmark is -0.16, and therefore it falls into the group of coun-
tries with a low tax wedge and a low unemployment rate, but it still has a small value and 
it may be said that Denmark is on the boundary between the two groups. The discrimi-
nant function obtained by this analysis will be used later to see in which group the dis-
criminant analysis places Croatia. 
5  The tax wedge in Croatia in view of the OECD 
Now since the hypothesis has been confirmed on the interdependence of the tax wedge 
and the unemployment rate, we will consider how large the tax wedge and the unemploy-
ment rate are in Croatia in comparison with OECD countries, and into which group Cro-
atia would fall. 
It is clear that Croatia is somewhere in the middle in terms of OECD countries, how-
ever it has quite a high unemployment rate. The average tax wedge for OECD countries 
is 37.7%, the tax wedge in Croatia is a little larger than that average (41.1%) so it could 
be said that Croatia has a relatively high tax wedge. However, looking at the unemploy-
ment rate, the situation in Croatia is quite worrying. That is to say, the range of unemploy-
ment rates in OECD countries is from 2.3 to 11.0%, and the average is 5.8%, whilst the 
registered unemployment rate in Croatia is 14.8%. Therefore, although the tax wedge in 
Croatia is slightly higher than the average, the unemployment rate is much higher than in 
OECD countries. EU members who are also members of the OECD have on average a 
much greater tax wedge than the total average of the OECD (38.8, 43.0, 47.6) and Croa-
tia has a slightly lower tax wedge than the EU members. Research by the European Com-
mission shows that EU members4 have been working since 2000 on reducing their tax 
wedge, and it was falling right up until 2005, when the fall came to a halt (European Com-
mission, 2008).
3 My own calculation: functions used in SPSS.
4 EU-25, EU members in 2006458
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Figure 4 The tax wedge in OECD countries and Croatia
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OECD countries will again be divided into three equal classes, as before, that is, those 
with low, medium and high tax wedges, but now including Croatia. This analysis places 
Croatia in the group with the medium sized tax wedge, which also includes Japan, the 
USA, Switzerland, Canada, the United kingdom, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Slo-
vakia, Spain, Denmark and Greece. However the range of the medium class is from 29.2% 
to 42.5% and it is visible that Croatia is close to the boundary with the third class, that is 
the group with a high tax wedge. 
As has already been said, the tax wedge consists of contributions and taxes paid by 
the employee and the employer. Table 4 shows the share of contributions and taxes in the 
total gross labour costs in Croatia and OECD countries. 459
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Table 4   The share of contributions and taxes in the gross labour costs in Croatia and 
OECD countries
Country Taxes paid 
by employeea
Contributions 
paid by 
employee
Contributions 
paid by 
employer 
Payroll taxb Tax wedge
Mexico 4.1 1.3 10.6 0.0 15.9
korea 4.3 6.7 8.7 0.0 19.7
New Zealand 21.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.5
Irelandc 8.4 4.7 9.7 0.0 22.7
Australia 22.1 0.0 0.0 5.7 27.7
Iceland 22.9 0.2 5.1 0.0 28.1
Japan 7.1 10.7 11.5 0.0 29.3
USA 15.4 7.1 7.2 0.0 29.7
Switzerland 9.8 10.0 10.0 0.0 29.7
Canada 14.2 6.6 10.4 0.0 31.2
United kingdom 15.9 8.3 9.7 0.0 34.0
Luxemburg 13.8 10.6 11.9 0.0 36.3
Norway 19.3 6.9 11.3 0.0 37.5
Portugal 9.6 8.9 19.2 0.0 37.7
Slovakia 7.2 10.6 20.8 0.0 38.6
Spain 10.9 4.9 23.2 0.0 38.9
Denmark 30.3 10.5 0.6 0.0 41.4
Greece 7.9 12.5 21.9 0.0 42.3
Turkeyc 12.7 12.3 17.7 0.0 42.7
Poland 5.5 20.5 17.0 0.0 42.9
Czech Republic 7.8 9.3 25.9 0.0 42.9
Finland 18.8 5.4 19.4 0.0 43.6
The Netherlands 13.0 18.0 13.2 0.0 44.3
Sweden 15.5 5.3 21.2 3.3 45.3
Italy 14.8 7.2 24.3 0.0 46.2
Austria 12.0 14.0 16.7 5.8 48.6
France 9.9 9.6 29.7 0.0 49.2
Germany 18.4 17.6 16.6 0.0 52.6
Hungary 16.2 12.6 23.8 1.9 54.5
Belgium 21.7 10.7 23.4 0.0 55.8
Average 13.7 8.8 14.7 0.6 37.7
Croatia 9.4 17.1 14.7 0.0 41.1
a Income tax and surtaxes
b Paid by employer.
c Old definition of AW used, that is worker employed in sector D
Source: for OECD countries (OECD, 2008), for Croatia, the author’s calculations
It is visible that the tax wedge systems in OECD countries differ, which is the result 
of the differing political characteristics of member countries. In most OECD countries, as 
well as in Croatia, the tax wedge consists of taxes and contributions paid by the employ-460
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ee and contributions paid by the employer. But some OECD countries also have a payroll 
tax which is paid by employers. For a better comparison of the share of expenses, the tax 
wedge will be divided into the part paid by the employee and the part paid by the employ-
er. The share of expenses paid by the employee in Croatia amounts to 26.4% and in OECD 
countries 22.5%, whilst the share of costs for employers in Croatia is 14.7% and in OECD 
countries 15.2% of the gross costs of labour. Therefore, looking at the tax wedge system 
in Croatia, the burden on the employee is greater than in OECD countries whilst the bur-
den on the employer is less than in OECD countries. 
The question arises whether it is better for the burden to be on the employer or the 
employee. If the burden is borne by the employee, it may have differing results. The dis-
couraging results of progression are well known, that is the effect of substitution (in this 
case work for leisure). The negative effect on the supply of work may be further increased 
where low incomes interact with a variety of payments from various social transfers and 
privileges (Blažić, 2006, p. 121). Precisely employees with low wages and low qualifica-
tions are most hit by a high unemployment rate, therefore in the middle of the 1990’s some 
EU members (Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain) focused on 
those groups and reduced the tax wedge for them (Joumard 2001.).  
If the burden is not borne by the employee but by the employer, this could be moti-
vation for the employer to substitute work for capital, reduce production or relocate pro-
duction to another country with lower labour costs. Furthermore, it is thought that the pos-
itive effect on demand for labour comes precisely from payments which are formally borne 
by the employer, that is contributions paid by the employers. That is to say, contributions 
by employers reduce the after tax wage to which the gross wage may react slowly (in the 
sense of increasing – that is to transfer of the burden to the employer – or even not), whilst 
an increase in contributions by employers directly increases the costs of labour (OECD, 
2001, pp. 27, 52). So, exclusively burdening the employer or the employee has negative 
effects and it is necessary to find a balance between the burdens. 
Cluster analysis, including Croatia, produces the following dendrogram.
Figure 5 Dendrogram of cluster analysis of OECD countries and Croatia
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The values on the x axis are the ordinal number of the OECD countries, the same as 
before, that is: 1–Mexico, 2–korea, 3–New Zealand, 4–Ireland, 5–Australia, 6–Iceland, 
7–Japan, 8–USA, 9–Switzerland, 10–Canada, 11–United kingdom, 12–Luxembourg, 
13–Norway, 14–Portugal, 15–Slovakia, 16–Spain, 17–Denmark, 18–Greece, 19–Turkey, 
20–Poland, 21–Czech Republic, 22–Finland, 23–The Netherlands, 24–Sweden, 25–Italy, 
26–Austria, 27–France, 28–Germany, 29–Hungary, 30–Belgium with the addition of Cro-
atia as 31. 
It may be seen that Croatia, with a tax wedge of 41.1% and an unemployment rate of 
14.8%, is most similar to Greece, Turkey and Poland in the cluster analysis. Those are the 
countries with have a tax wedge larger than Croatia (42.3, 42.7, 42.9), but a lower unem-
ployment rate than Croatia (8.1, 9.6, 9.6). Although they have a lower unemployment rate 
than Croatia, those are countries with a high unemployment rate, that is they have a rate 
somewhat higher than the average for OECD countries. 
As before, the cluster analysis of all countries is divided into two groups. The first 
group, with a small tax wedge and low unemployment rate, is the same as before, whilst 
Croatia is now included in the second group. Therefore, it may be concluded that Croatia 
is a country with a high tax wedge and a high unemployment rate. 
In order to check if the cluster analysis has included Croatia correctly in the countries 
with a high tax wedge and a high unemployment rate, we undertake further discriminant 
analysis. The discriminant function is used that was obtained in the discriminant analysis 
of OECD countries, that is formula (5). For Croatia it amounts to z=3.39, i.e. it places 
Croatia in the group with a large tax wedge and a high unemployment rate. The value of 
the discriminant function is quite large due to the high unemployment rate. 
6  Conclusion 
It has been seen that “a connection exists” which indicates the mutual causation of 
the tax wedge and unemployment, that is a high tax wedge brings with it a high unem-
ployment rate. A high tax wedge has a negative effect on the employee and the employer 
by increasing unemployment. That is to say, a high tax wedge demotivates employees in 
seeking work due to the large payments to the state and the small net wage, and also par-
tially due to the payments they receive while they are unemployed. This problem is seen 
most clearly in people with low wages, when the difference between wages and unem-
ployment benefits is small. A high tax wedge also increases the costs of labour, which de-
motivates employers in employing new workers. On the other hand a low tax wedge has 
the opposite effect. So a low tax wedge encourages employees to find work due to the in-
crease in the net wage itself, but also employers to seek new workers due to the lower la-
bour costs. 
It has been seen that unemployment is a major problem in Croatia, but the unemploy-
ment rate used in this study is the registered unemployment rate, and does not give a true 
picture of employment in Croatia. That is to say, it would perhaps be better to consider 
the survey rate, which is quite low for Croatia (in the last quarter of 2007 it was 9.7%, in 
the third quarter of 2008 7%). But for the sake of comparison with OECD countries, the 
registered unemployment rate was used in the study. In further research it would be use-462
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ful to extend the methodology and compare the survey unemployment rate for OECD 
countries and Croatia. Also further research could be extended to assess what the effect 
of the tax wedge could be on unemployment. 
At the beginning of this study it was assumed that precisely a large tax wedge was a 
cause of high unemployment. Looking at the situation in Croatia, this was indeed proba-
bly one of the major causes, but over the last few years changes have been introduced to 
the tax burden which have reduced the tax wedge. The largest changes in the taxation of 
labour in Croatia happened at the beginning of the 1990’s when a foundation was set which 
is still used today. From 1994 to 2005 further changes were introduced, such as an increase 
in personal allowances, increases in the coefficient of personal allowances for maintenance 
of dependent family and children and for the areas of special state concern, and for social-
ly endangered citizens, changes to tax rates and classes, and changes to the amounts and 
structure of mandatory contributions by employers and employees (Petrović, 2007). So in 
1994 the tax wedge was more than 50%, in 1997 about 45% and in 2005 39.5%. Howev-
er the tax wedge in Croatia is still quite large and work should be done to reduce it. 
Reduction of the tax wedge could be performed in several ways, for example by in-
creasing personal allowances, reducing income tax, reducing contributions on income, re-
ducing contributions by employers and employees etc. The problem in Croatia is not in-
come tax, which is relatively low in relation to other countries, but contributions, espe-
cially contributions paid by employees, where Croatia has one of the largest burdens in 
the world. But a reduction in contributions is closely related to reforms of the health and 
pension insurance systems (kesner-Škreb 2007.). 
An increase in personal allowances would reduce payments by the employee, which 
would mostly help employees in the areas of special state concern and families with chil-
dren and also, apart from reducing the tax wedge and increasing employment, would prob-
ably have a positive effect on the birth rate in Croatia. Croatia made precisely this move 
in 2008, that is personal allowances were increased from 1600 to 1800 kuna a month. The 
increase in personal allowances mainly led to a decrease in the tax wedge of workers with 
children and workers in the areas of special state concern. The tax wedge for December 
2008 in Croatia amounted to: 38.41, 40.99 and 45.365, so the changes in relation to 2007 
are: -4bps, -13bps, -6bps, whilst the registered unemployment rate for 2008 was 13.26, so 
unemployment fell in that year by 1.6 percentage points. 
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